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# European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority Public Consultation

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#### Introduction

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic revealed vulnerabilities in European health preparedness and crisis response for serious cross-border threats to health. Member States encountered difficulties in ensuring monitoring on needs, swift development, manufacturing, procurement, and equitable distribution of key medical countermeasures such as personal protective equipment, medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices (including tests and testing materials), available therapies, vaccines and essential medicines. Some of these (e.g. protective equipment, such as masks or gloves, swabs, reagents, ventilators and some other medical devices and medicines used in intensive care units) ran short, whilst much-needed vaccines and therapies were not at authorisation or even at late stage development. Overall, the pandemic revealed vulnerabilities in global supply chains and insufficient oversight of manufacturing capacities and research priorities in the EU.

This new initiative is an integral part of the <u>European Health Union proposal</u> of November 2020. It aims to equip the Union with a new Authority, similar to the US BARDA, which addresses all future serious cross-border threats to health. The new Authority, which will be called the "European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority" (HERA), will take into account the EU institutional setting and provide for a coordinated approach to health preparedness for the full array of serious cross-border threats to health that takes into account competences of the Member States in this area. HERA will complement and create synergies with the work of existing national and EU Agencies, in particular the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA). Further <u>background information</u> on the creation of the legislative proposal for HERA may be found in the hyperlinks.

Please note that this consultation relates specifically to the European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority. The Commission Communication 'Hera Incubator: Anticipating together the threat of COVID-19 variants' of February 2021 is not a legislative proposal. Therefore, this consultation does not serve to provide feedback on the work being undertaken by the Commission on mitigating, preventing and preparing for COVID-19 variants described in that Communication.

This questionnaire will be available in all EU-languages in the coming weeks. It includes several thematic sections. The specific terminology is explained at the beginning of the relevant sections.

# About you

<sup>\*</sup>Language of my contribution

Croatian
Czech
Danish
Dutch
English
Estonian
Finnish
French
German
Greek
Hungarian
Irish
Italian
Latvian
Lithuanian
Maltese
Polish
Portuguese
Romanian
Slovak
Slovenian
Spanish
Swedish
*I am giving my contribution as
Academic/research institution
Business association
Company/business organisation
Consumer organisation
EU citizen
Environmental organisation
Non-EU citizen
Non-governmental organisation (NGO)
Public authority

Bulgarian

Trade union			
Other			
*First name			
Monika			
*Surname			
Derecque-Pois			
*Email (this won't be p	ublished)		
girp@girp.eu			
*Organisation name			
255 character(s) maximum			
GIRP - European Healtho	care Distribution Association	on	
*Organisation size			
Micro (1 to 9 em	ployees)		
Small (10 to 49 e)	employees)		
Medium (50 to 2	49 employees)		
Large (250 or mo	, ,		
Transparency register	· number		
255 character(s) maximum			
		er. It's a voluntary database fo	r organisations seeking to
influence EU decision-making	J.		
0757172464-29			
*Country of origin			
Please add your country of or	igin, or that of your organis	sation.	
Afghanistan	Djibouti	Libya	Saint Martin
Åland Islands	Dominica	Liechtenstein	Saint Pierre
			and Miquelon
Albania	Dominican	Lithuania	Saint Vincent
	Republic		and the
	•		Grenadines

Algeria	Ecuador	Luxembourg	Samoa
<ul><li>American</li><li>Samoa</li></ul>	Egypt	Macau	San Marino
Andorra	El Salvador	Madagascar	São Tomé and Príncipe
Angola	Equatorial Guinea	Malawi	Saudi Arabia
Anguilla	Eritrea	Malaysia	Senegal
Antarctica	Estonia	Maldives	Serbia
<ul><li>Antigua and Barbuda</li></ul>	Eswatini	Mali	Seychelles
Argentina	Ethiopia	Malta	Sierra Leone
Armenia	Falkland Islands	<ul><li>Marshall Islands</li></ul>	Singapore
Aruba	Faroe Islands	Martinique	Sint Maarten
Australia	Fiji	Mauritania	Slovakia
Austria	Finland	Mauritius	Slovenia
Azerbaijan	France	Mayotte	Solomon
			Islands
Bahamas	French Guiana	Mexico	Somalia
Bahrain	French Polynesia	Micronesia	South Africa
Bangladesh	French	Moldova	South Georgia
	Southern and		and the South
	Antarctic Lands		Sandwich Islands
Barbados	Gabon	Monaco	South Korea
Belarus	Georgia	Mongolia	South Sudan
Belgium	Germany	Montenegro	Spain
Belize	Ghana	Montserrat	Sri Lanka
Benin	Gibraltar	Morocco	Sudan
Bermuda	Greece	Mozambique	Suriname
Bhutan	Greenland	Myanmar	Svalbard and
O Delivie	O Cropada	/Burma	Jan Mayen
Bolivia	Grenada	Namibia	Sweden

©	Bonaire Saint Eustatius and Saba	0	Guadeloupe	0	Nauru	0	Switzerland
0	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	Guam	0	Nepal	0	Syria
0	Botswana	0	Guatemala		Netherlands		Taiwan
0	Bouvet Island	0	Guernsey	0	New Caledonia	0	Tajikistan
0	Brazil		Guinea	0	New Zealand	0	Tanzania
0	British Indian Ocean Territory	0	Guinea-Bissau	0	Nicaragua	0	Thailand
0	British Virgin Islands	0	Guyana	0	Niger	0	The Gambia
	Brunei		Haiti		Nigeria		Timor-Leste
0	Bulgaria		Heard Island and McDonald Islands		Niue		Togo
	Burkina Faso		Honduras		Norfolk Island		Tokelau
0	Burundi	0	Hong Kong	0	Northern Mariana Islands	0	Tonga
0	Cambodia	0	Hungary	0	North Korea	0	Trinidad and Tobago
0	Cameroon	0	Iceland	0	North Macedonia	0	Tunisia
	Canada		India		Norway		Turkey
	Cape Verde		Indonesia		Oman		Turkmenistan
	Cayman Islands		Iran		Pakistan		Turks and
							Caicos Islands
0	Central African Republic	0	Iraq	0	Palau	0	Tuvalu
	Chad		Ireland		Palestine		Uganda
	Chile		Isle of Man		Panama		Ukraine
	China		Israel		Papua New		United Arab
					Guinea		Emirates
0	Christmas Island	0	Italy	0	Paraguay	0	United Kingdom

0	Clipperton	Jamaica	0	Peru	0	United States
0			0		0	
	Cocos (Keeling)	Japan		Philippines		United States
	Islands					Minor Outlying
						Islands
	Colombia	Jersey		Pitcairn Islands		Uruguay
	Comoros	Jordan		Poland	0	US Virgin
						Islands
0	Congo	Kazakhstan	0	Portugal		Uzbekistan
0	Cook Islands	Kenya		Puerto Rico		Vanuatu
0	Costa Rica	Kiribati	0	Qatar		Vatican City
0	Côte d'Ivoire	Kosovo		Réunion		Venezuela
0	Croatia	Kuwait		Romania		Vietnam
0	Cuba	Kyrgyzstan	0	Russia		Wallis and
						Futuna
0	Curaçao	Laos		Rwanda		Western
						Sahara
0	Cyprus	Latvia	0	Saint		Yemen
				Barthélemy		
0	Czechia	Lebanon		Saint Helena		Zambia
				Ascension and		
				Tristan da		
				Cunha		
0	Democratic	Lesotho	0	Saint Kitts and	0	Zimbabwe
	Republic of the	20000		Nevis		
	Congo					
0	Denmark	Liberia	0	Saint Luaia		
	Dellillaik	LIDEIIA		Saint Lucia		

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# \*Contribution publication privacy settings

The Commission will publish the responses to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would like your details to be made public or to remain anonymous.

# Anonymous

Only organisation details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published as received. Your name will not be published. Please do not include any personal data in the contribution itself if you want to remain anonymous.

#### Public

Organisation details and respondent details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published. Your name will also be published.

I agree with the personal data protection provisions

# EU framework to develop, manufacture and deploy medical countermeasures

Medical countermeasures refer to medicines, medical devices and other goods or services that are aimed at combating serious cross-border threats to health[1], a life- threatening or otherwise serious hazard to health of biological, chemical, environmental or unknown origin, which spreads or entails a significant risk of spreading across countries. These medical countermeasures may necessitate coordination at Union level in order to ensure a high level of human health protection. Examples consist of infectious diseases such as COVID-19, a pandemic influenza, or other events caused by biological or unknown agents, accidents caused by chemical agents, natural events of environmental origin or deliberate acts.

The EU framework for cross-border threats to health is based on Decision 1082/2013/EU, which sets out how the EU coordinates preparedness and response to serious cross-border threats to health. In light of COVID-19, the Commission put forward a proposal to revise this framework and proposed a Regulation for serious cross border threats to health, as well as reinforcements to the mandates of the key EU Agencies: The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency ( E M A ) .

In addition to Decision 1082/2013/EU, under which the Early Warning and Response System, the Health Security Committee and the Joint Procurement Agreement is established, the Commission has additional instruments that are active in the area of development, manufacturing and deployment of medical countermeasures.

These will be mentioned in below, but comprise for example: <u>EU4Health</u>, <u>Horizon Europe</u>, <u>European Innovation Council</u>, <u>European Regional Development Fund</u>, <u>Emergency Support Instrument</u>, the <u>European Defence Fund</u>; Advanced Purchase Agreements under the EU Vaccines Strategy, the Union Civil

<u>Protection Mechanism and its rescEU, Emergency Response Coordination Centre, Innovation Partnership, and external action support under EU programmes supporting our partners across the world.</u>

[1] Decision 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border threats to health

1. What is your view on the existing EU capability to develop, manufacture and deploy medical countermeasures (e.g. vaccines, antitoxins, antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antiviral drugs, personal protective equipment, medical devices, etc.) aimed at combating serious cross-border threats to health?

	Fragmented	Sub- optimal	Adequate	Good	Very good	Don't know
1.1 The EU capability to develop (including research) medical countermeasures is:	0	0	0	•	0	0
1.2 The EU capability to manufacture (production) medical countermeasures is:	0	•	0	0	0	0
1.3 The EU capability to deploy (distribution) medical countermeasures is:	0	0	0	0	•	0

#### If relevant, please provide further comments:

500 character(s) maximum

Full-service healthcare distributors, through their stock-keeping, their national and European web of distributions centres, and their transportation and logistical excellence can deliver any medicine in Europe within an average time of 2.5h (incl. to remote locations), provided they are supplied by MAHs - supply quotas jeopardise distribution capability. As proved by the roll-out of COVID-19 vaccines, healthcare distributors can fast adapt infrastructure and practices, upon good communication.

2. What is your view on the EU added value of HERA in light of the existing EU capacities in place to develop, manufacture and deploy medical countermeasures aimed at combating serious cross-border threats to health?

1000 character(s) maximum

HERA, if setup as a full end-to-end authority for streamlining of EU level initiatives on medical countermeasures for serious cross-border threats to health, will have the capacity to coordinate and streamline existing measures setup on an ad-hoc basis to urgently respond to issues arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. The agency should be in charge of conducting a thorough mapping of existing infrastructure at European level and assess their resilience as well as their capability to act quickly and appropriately to arising cross-border health threats. In the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, we observed a clear lack of harmonisation of national measures which led to disconcerted response across MS. HERA should be provided with the necessary power to ensure the according preparedness and response measures in the face of significant health threats, such as flexibility in moving stocks of medicinal products or building a stockpiling structure balancing national and European stocks.

3. What do you believe are the key challenges that should be tackled to ensure effective EU-wide access to the most developed medical countermeasures aimed at combating serious cross-border threats to health, including global threats?

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't know
Sufficient capacities are in place at national level to ensure foresight of healthcare delivery ahead of a health emergency.	0	•	0	0	0	0
Sufficient capacities are in place at national level to ensure demand analysis of healthcare delivery ahead of a health emergency.	•	•	•	•	•	•
Sufficient capacities are in place at national level to ensure planning of healthcare delivery ahead of a health emergency.	0	•	0	0	0	0

There is a risk of low-quality, non-compliant medical countermeasures entering the EU market.	•	•	0	•	•	0
Real-time, reliable and comparable information/data on global and national shortages of medical countermeasures is available at EU level.	0	•	0	•	©	0
Real-time, reliable and comparable information/data on available supplies (including global value chains and national stocks) is available at EU level.	0	•	0	•	0	0
Third country trade restrictions on medical countermeasures and/or inputs critical to their development/ production impact Member States.	0	0	0	•	•	0
EU Member States have unequal access to medical countermeasures.	0	0	0	•	©	0
EU Member States have to compete against each other for the research and development of medical countermeasures (e. g. higher prices, distorted access and lower EU wide utility).	•	•	•	©	©	•
EU Member States have to compete against each other for procurement of medical countermeasures (e.g. higher prices, distorted access and lower EU wide utility).	0	0	0	•	©	0
Lack of coordination at EU level of manufacturing capacity for medical countermeasures (leading to under- or overcapacity).	0	0	0	•	©	0

4. The Commission's preliminary assessment identified various challenges[1]

Do you think the following measures can overcome these challenges?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't know
Putting in place real-time monitoring of preparedness regarding the demand and supply of critical medical countermeasures in the EU	0	0	0	•	0	0
Ensuring increased coordination of efforts at EU level (e.g. avoid competition - e.g. research and development and procurement - between Member States).	0	•	0	•	0	0
Joint procurement by central purchasing bodies buying on behalf of other public buyers	0	0	0	•	0	•
Strengthening the EU Joint Procurement Agreement	0	0	0	•	0	0
Creation of a tailored EU procurement instrument for health emergency response and management.	0	0	0	•	0	0
An EU network of relevant enterprises in the supply chain of which production capacity can be immediately mobilised or repurposed without cross-border delivery constraints.	•	•	0	•	•	0
EU approach to address the whole life cycle of medical countermeasures capacity building (including tailored research and development, testing, certification, production and delivery logistics).	©	•	•	©	•	0

## If relevant, please provide further comments:

500 character(s) maximum

Full-service healthcare distributors have proven their resilience as a key partner in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. They have the agility to fast devise contingency plans to ensure equitable access to medicines with low stock levels due to unprecedented peaks in demand. They are fully equipped and have been calling to be included in the response building - e.g., stockpiling, vaccine distribution - with appropriate funding in place to sustain such capacity building.

[1] See question 3 for challenges (e.g. foresight, demand analysis and planning of healthcare delivery ahead of a health emergency; low-quality, non-compliant medical countermeasures entering the EU market; real-time, reliable and comparable information/data on national shortages and available supplies (including stocks) of medical countermeasures is available at EU level; Member States can have unequal access to medical countermeasures; EU Member States have to compete against each other for the development and procurement of medical countermeasures; lack of coordination of manufacturing capacity for medical countermeasures.)

#### Threat and risk assessments & EU instruments

Public health modelling is an essential element for anticipatory threat and risk assessments. Modelling should be considered as the simulation of scenarios based on mathematical techniques and all available data (e.g. indicator- and event based data). In this context, it may extend to modelling of health risks and impacts of health interventions using medical countermeasures.

Needs monitoring in this context extends to the monitoring of the quantity and the specific type of medical countermeasure(s) that a Member State requires in terms of its preparedness and response to a serious cross-border threat to health.

# 5. How would you qualify:

	Fragmented	Sub- Optimal	Adequate	Good	Very Good	Other	Don't know
Capacity for anticipatory public health threat and risk assessments at EU level (including global threats)	©	•	0	0	0	0	©
Capacity for modelling and foresight of serious cross-border threats to health at EU level (including global threats)	0	•	0	0	0	0	0
EU instruments for <b>research</b> , <b>innovation and development</b> of medical countermeasures[1]	0	0	•	0	0	0	0
EU instruments for access and deployment of medical countermeasures[2]	0	0	•	0	0	0	©

# If relevant, please provide further comments

500 character(s) maximum

The lack of PPE among other medical devices early in the pandemic and the ongoing difficulties faced in the roll-out of the COVID-19 vaccines campaign show the deficiencies in our response system as well as the lack of harmonisation across Member States approaches. While instruments such as joints procurements present value in access to vaccines and other medical countermeasures, more coordination is needed to immediately make full use of the healthcare distribution current structure in place.

# 6. What are your views on the following?

	This should be addressed at a national level and not by the EU	There is no need to change. The current EU system should be maintained	The EU should further strengthen coordination and capacities in this area	Don' t know
6.1 EU capacity for anticipatory public health threat and risk assessments at EU level and including global threats:	•	•	•	0
6.2 EU capacity for modelling and foresight of serious cross-border threats to health at EU level and including global threats:	©	©	•	•
6.3 EU instruments for research, innovation and development[3] of medical countermeasures:	•	•	•	0
6.4 EU instruments for access and deployment[4] of medical countermeasures:	0	0	•	0

# If relevant, please provide further comments

5	500 character(s) maximum								

[1] e.g. <u>Horizon Europe</u>, <u>European Innovation Council</u>, <u>European Regional Development Fund</u>, the <u>European Defence Fund</u>

[2] e.g. Joint Procurements, Advanced Purchase Agreements under the <u>EU Vaccines Strategy</u>, Emergency Support Instrument the <u>Union Civil Protection Mechanism and its resc</u>EU and Emergency Response Coordination Centre, Innovation Partnership, external action support under EU programmes supporting our partners across the world

[3] e.g. Horizon Europe, European Innovation Council, European Regional Development Fund, the E u r o p e a n D e f e n c e F u n d

[4] e.g. Joint Procurements, Advanced Purchase Agreements under the EU Vaccines Strategy, Emergency Support Instrument the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and its rescEU and Emergency Response Coordination Centre, Innovation Partnership, external action support under EU programmes supporting our partners across the world

# Market dynamics and supply chain intelligence

The market (e.g. demand and supply) of medical countermeasures is constantly evolving and faces a variety of changing challenges. As such, knowledge and awareness of novel technologies, as well as pressures that can affect demand and supply - that can impact the availability of medical countermeasures – is important to monitor. Such pressures include, for example, incentives of key stakeholders (such as investors, industry and innovators), return on investment, uncertainty of demand, and impacts of future risks and needs. The supply chains of medical countermeasures extends to overall awareness of the supply into the EU and countries of specific medical countermeasures, as well as manufacturing capacities within the EU (including reconversion/repurposing possibilities) and the EU's position in global supply chains for critical raw materials needed to produce the final product.

7. To what extent is there a need for EU level action to strengthen the following elements for ensuring sufficient demand and supply of medical countermeasures in the EU?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don' t know
Real-time analysis at EU level of the demand for medical countermeasures	0	0	0	•	0	0
EU level knowledge of exports of medical countermeasures from EU Member States to third countries	0	0	0	0	•	0
EU level knowledge of suppliers and supply chain of medical countermeasures into EU Member States	0	0	0	•	0	0
EU level knowledge of supply deliveries of medical countermeasures into EU Member States	0	0	0	•	0	0
Market intelligence to anticipate possible interruptions in the demand and supply of medical countermeasure	0	0	0	0	•	0
EU level knowledge on logistical distribution of medical countermeasures to Member States	0	0	0	•	0	0
EU level knowledge on manufacturing capacities within the EU for medical countermeasures	0	0	0	0	•	0
EU level knowledge on identification and support to repurposing/reconversion activities of manufacturing capacities for medical countermeasures within the EU	0	0	0	•	0	0
Sustainability of EU supply chains of medical countermeasures and flexible supply of key inputs	0	0	0	0	•	0
EU level knowledge on supply dependency from third country	0	0	0	0	•	0
stockpiling capacity (e.g. virtual or physical or otherwise) at EU level	0	0	0	0	•	0
Market intelligence for new countermeasures or innovative technologies	0	0	©	0	•	0

EU level knowledge on national public sector investment into research and development of medical countermeasures	0	0	•	0	0	0
EU level knowledge on private sector investment into research and development of medical countermeasures	0	0	•	0	0	0

8.

	Undesirable	Neutral	Desirable	Don't know
What is your view on increasing EU level action in the market dynamics (e.g. demand and supply, as well as supply chains) of medical countermeasures?	•	0	•	0

## If relevant, please provide further comments

500 cha	aracter(s) maximum			

9. What is your view on strategic autonomy in the area of medical countermeasures to respond to health emergencies considering actions at EU, regional or national level?

500 character(s) maximum

The pandemic has demonstrated the need for coordination at regional, national and EU level. For a strong and fast response to patient demand, buffer stocks need to be held at regional and national level to absorb sudden peaks. The EU stockpile should be built on the basis of a list of potentially critical medicinal products to complement existing buffer stocks and should allow for swift dispatching across the EU, allowing regulatory flexibility in respect of packaging and labelling.

# Development and financing of new countermeasures in times of crisis

Upfront investment and parallel development processes pertains to undertaking financial investments for the development and access to medical countermeasures prior to a final product being available, approved or produced. Parallel development processes of medical countermeasures refers to when product development occurs prior or whilst the product is undertaking trials, approvals, market demand, etc. The contrary is sequential development process, which is approached in a step-by-step fashion.

Flexible and "ready to use" EU manufacturing capacities would entail the management of manufacturing infrastructure at the EU level, that remains ready to be activated for the production of a given medical countermeasure for the EU. It should optimally be 'flexible' in order to be able to manufacture key medical countermeasures that may require different technological/engineering requirements.

'One-stop shop', refers to an entity that manages and controls all instruments related to a product or service – in this case medical countermeasures for the EU.

10.

	Very Undesirable	Undesirable	Neutral	Desirable	Very Desirable	Don't know
What is your opinion on further EU intervention in upfront investment and parallel development processes to ensure rapid manufacturing of needed medical countermeasures in a health emergency, primarily within Europe but also from a global perspective?	©	0	0	•	0	0

	Public- private partnerships	Direct contracts	Disburse schen		Fees	Combine EU and nationa financin
What kind of tailored financial instruments would be needed in your view to facilitate upfront EU investment?	•	0	0		0	0
relevant, please provide fur	ther commer	nts				
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2. Is there an optimal stag	ge of produc	ct develor	oment u	pon wl	hich fir	nancial
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If relevant, please provide further comments

Voluntary licensing mechanisms facilitating an effective and rapid sharing of technology, know-how and data with other manufacturers, but also ensuring technology owners' control over their rights	•	©	•	•	©	•
Streamlined EU level initiatives relating to medical countermeasures under a 'onestop shop'	•	0	•	•	0	0

### If relevant, please provide further comments

50	500 character(s) maximum								

# Impacts, role, scope and coordination

14. How would you rate the expected health, economic, social and environmental impacts, as well as the impact on consumer protection and administrative burden (adverse or positive), which the creation of HERA[1] would trigger (primarily from an EU perspective but also from a global perspective)?

	Negative impact	Neutral impact	Positive impact	Don't know
Health	0	0	•	0
Economic	0	0	•	0
Social	0	0	•	0
Environmental	0	•	0	0
Consumer protection	0	0	•	0
Administrative burden	0	•	0	0

# Please provide further explanations:

500 character(s) maximum

A mapping of existing infrastructure at European level and the implementation of a response plan coordinating Member States efforts can only prove beneficial to the health of EU citizens. Ensuring effective synergies between supply chain actors, Member States, European institutions and agencies should lead to economic efficiency. HERA will have to assess the resilience of stakeholders while ensuring administration doesn't burden the sector which must remain agile in the face of health threats.

15. What types of health threats should the HERA prioritize (e.g. chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear, environmental)?

As	all	threats	can	have	a similar	impact.	thev	all s	should	be ed	ually	prioritised	d.
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16. What types of medical countermeasures should the HERA prioritize (e.g. vaccines, antibiotics, antitoxins, chemical antidotes, therapeutics, diagnostics and medical equipment and supplies)?

500 character(s) maximum

As all threats can have a similar impact therefore, they all should be equally prioritised.

17. What should be the interplay of HERA with other EU Agencies (e.g. <u>European Medicines Agency</u>, <u>European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention</u>, <u>European Food Safety Authority</u>, <u>European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction</u>, <u>European Environment Agency</u>, <u>European Chemicals Agency</u>, <u>Europol</u>)?

1000 character(s) maximum

Their activities should be closely aligned but HERA should be independent with full powers and accountable to the public and not hieratical institutions or governments.

18. What should be the interaction of HERA with other EU instruments contributing to the development, manufacturing and deployment of medical countermeasures (e. g. <u>EU4Health</u>, <u>Horizon Europe</u>, <u>European Innovation Council</u>, <u>European Regional Development Fund</u>, <u>Emergency Support Instrument</u>, the <u>European Defence Fund</u>; Advanced Purchase Agreements under the <u>EU Vaccines Strategy</u>, the <u>Union Civil Protection Mechanism and its rescEU</u>, <u>Emergency Response Coordination Centre</u>, Innovation Partnership, and external action support under EU programmes supporting our partners across the world.)? Should they be:

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree	Don' t know
Coordinated like they are now, ensuring synergies with HERA when created	0	0	•	0	0	0
Coordinated by HERA when created in close collaboration with the European Commission, Member States and other relevant agencies	©	0	•	0	•	0
Brought under the control of HERA when created by streamlining them						

into one full end-to end (e.g. from				
conception to distribution and use	©	0	•	0
of medical countermeasures,				
incorporating all existing financial				
and operational instruments at EU				
level) Authority?				

	If relevant,	please	provide	further	comments:
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500 character(s) maximum					

19. What would be in your view the role and interplay of HERA with key international bodies/agencies (e.g. World Health Organization, Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, U.S. Biomedical Advanced Research and Development and U.S. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, etc.)

5	00 character(s) maximum

[1] This pertains to policy options 2-3, as set out in the Inception Impact Assessment

#### Business and their associations

21. What would be the best cooperation model and contribution between your entities and HERA?

1000 character(s) maximum

Hera should work in close cooperation with all supply chain stakeholders, including full-service healthcare distributors whose expertise is required in situations of health-threats. Full-service healthcare distributors have the capacity to optimise stock management via rationalisation of available stocks if needed and importantly in holding rotating emergency stocks, preventing products from expiring by applying FEFO (first expired first out) principles, through the integration of emergency stocks into normal operations (thereby strictly respecting the agreed buffer quantities), which is a unique capability of our sector. They are instrumental in ensuring safe, efficient and equitable access to medicines to patients through their local community pharmacists.

#### Other

22. Would you like to raise other issues that need to be address? If so, please specify:

500 character(s) maximum						

Any countermeasure proposed as part of a HERA project must be focused on preparedness and, where it involves transparency or access to medicines, it should clearly focus on an established list of potentially critical medicinal products. All proposals need to take account of the wider supply chain actors. Where actions are proposed, their impact should be assessed for all actors in the supply chain.

23. If you wish to provide additional information (for example a position paper) or raise specific points not covered by this questionnaire, you can upload your additional document here.

Only files of the type pdf,txt,doc,docx,odt,rtf are allowed

#### **Contact**

**Contact Form**